Corporate Point Men and the Creation of the Montana Central Railroad, 1882-87 by Lang, William L
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Great Plains Quarterly Great Plains Studies, Center for 
1990 
Corporate Point Men and the Creation of the Montana Central 
Railroad, 1882-87 
William L. Lang 
Columbia River History 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly 
 Part of the Other International and Area Studies Commons 
Lang, William L., "Corporate Point Men and the Creation of the Montana Central Railroad, 1882-87" (1990). 
Great Plains Quarterly. 481. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly/481 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Great Plains Studies, Center for at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Great Plains Quarterly by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
CORPORATE POINT MEN AND THE CREATION 
OF THE MONTANA CENTRAL RAILROAD, 
1882 .. 87 
WILLIAM L. LANG 
On 21 November 1887, a crowd jammed 
Ming's Opera House in Helena, Montana, to 
celebrate the completion of the Montana Cen-
tral Railway, a branch line of the St. Paul, 
Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway. Sharing the 
Opera House stage that day were railroad ex-
ecutives and managers from the East, Montana 
politicians, and local businessmen. Their rea-
son for celebration was three-fold. First, because 
Montalaans had struggled for more than a de-
cade to get rail connections, sometimes nearly 
making unwise and unnecessary deals with rail-
road corporations, getting a railroad to build 
through Montana was cause for celebration. 
William L. Lang, research director of the Center 
for Columbia River History in Vancouver, Wash-
ington, is working on a book about the Columbia 
River. For many years he edited Montana the 
Magazine of Western History, and the revised 
edition of his Montana: A History of Two Cen-
turies (with Michael Malone and Richard Roeder) 
is forthcoming in 1991. 
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Second, the Montana Central brought with it 
the promise of breaking an oppressive rail agree-
ment that had weighed heavily on Montana. 
The Union Pacific, which had built to Butte 
in 1881, and the Northern Pacific, which had 
completed its transcontinental road through 
Helena in 1883, had concocted a rate pool 
agreement that set artificially high freight rates. 
Third, the completion of the Montana Central 
ended a bitter economic and political war that 
had divided businessmen and split up political 
alliances within the city.! 
The crowd at Ming's had these developments 
in their minds as they clapped and cheered at 
the speechmakers. But they turned their pri-
mary focus on James Jerome Hill, the forty-
nine-year-old president of the St. Paul, Min-
neapolis & Manitoba Railway, the man who 
had brought the Montana Central to Helena. 
Just emerging as a major player in railroad de-
velopment in the Northwest, Hill brought with 
him a reputation as a man of capital, power, 
and corporate success. It was a reputation that 
often elicited fear among westerners because he 
was one of those distant financial and political 
power brokers who seemingly controlled Mon-
tana's fate. But he also had a reputation as a 
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FIG. 1. In 1886, the Montana Central had been completed from the main line of the Manitoba at Great Falls to 
Helena. The line to Rimini and the Red Mountain mines was built by the Northern Pacific. Map by George Cram, 
1886, courtesy of Montana Historical Society. 
dynamic and manipulative entrepreneur who 
had brought essential rail connections to the 
isolated northern territories. The Montana 
Central was Hill's first penetration of the Mon-
tana market, but the railway would gain even 
more significance when Hill completed the rest 
of the Manitoba's mainline across the state-
the new transcontinental Great Northern Rail-
way that would be completed in 1893 and con-
nect St. Paul with Puget Sound. 2 
The Great Northern Railway was both dream 
and goal in his mind as Hill stood before the 
appreciative crowd, but still he had reason to 
boast in 1887. His Manitoba railway had built 
643 miles across Dakota and Montana, setting 
a record for track-laying in a single season and 
bringing relief to Montana shippers who had 
suffered under the UP -NP rate pool agreement. 3 
The crowd cheered when Hill listed the 
achievements, but their loudest ovations came 
when he tipped his hat to his Montana asso-
ciates on the opera house stage, his point men 
in building the Montana Central. 4 They were 
men of influence in Montana, men who under-
stood business and had political savvy. Principal 
among them were Territorial Delegate Martin 
Maginnis, Great Falls founder Paris Gibson, and 
freighting entrepreneur Charles A. Broadwater. 
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THE POINT MEN 
Not unlike a general with his cavalry officers, 
Hill used his point men for intelligence reports, 
suggestions on tactics, and reactions to overall 
strategies. Hill provided the power of corporate 
investment and decision making, while the point 
men prepared the ground in Montana between 
1884 and 1888, the critical years of the Man-
itoba's extension into the Territory. Hill was a 
veteran of successful corporate teamwork and 
he understood its importance; he had benefited 
enormously from his early associations with the 
aggressive entrepreneurs, Norman Kittson, 
Donald Smith, George Stephen, and John S. 
Kennedy, who together had created the Man-
itoba road during the late 1870s. 5 Hill listened 
to his financial partners-Stephen, Smith, 
Kennedy, Edward Nichols, Samuel Thome, 
Greenleaf Clark, and others-who invested in 
his schemes and served as a quasi board of di-
rectors. They questioned his plans in Montana, 
advised him on how to organize complementary 
corporations, and devised critically important 
strategies for selling bond issues. He especially 
relied on Kennedy, who carefully monitored de-
velopments in St. Paul and Helena from his 
office in New York. The Hill-Kennedy combi-
nation, as Albro Martin has put it, was "the 
strongest railroad team in the Northwest."6 
It was the western end of Hill's transconti-
nental team, however, that had the most pro-
found effect on Manitoba's fortunes. In ways 
that Montanans and Hill could not have an-
ticipated, the point men took on the brunt of 
the tough work of railroad building on the fron-
tier. That work pushed these point men to their 
financial and political limits, forCing them to 
FIG. 2. By 1891, the Manitoba had become the Great Northern Railway and the Montana Central extended through 
Helena to Butte. Map from the Second Annual Report of the Great Northern Railway Company, 1891, courtesy of 
Montana Historical Society. 
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way bill that would open Dakota and Montana 
Indian reservations to transit by the Manitoba 
road. 10 
Maginnis had been one of several Demo, 
cratic politicians in Montana, including Wil, 
liam A. Clark, Marcus Daly, Samuel T. Hauser 
(Fig. 4), and Charles Broadwater, who had aI, 
lied themselves with key Republicans to pro' 
mote a general economic development of the 
Territory. Montana's political leadership during 
the territorial period split on many issues while 
maintaining a "no,party" structure and govern, 
ing by coalitions. Throughout politicians agreed 
that the first interest was economic and general 
development of the territory. In addition, Ma, 
ginnis and Hauser had developed strong ties 
with other western Democrats who were inter, 
ested in economic development, notably Sen, 
ator George Vest of Missouri. 11 For Democrat 
and entrepreneur Hill, these political connec, 
tions were essential if he expected to launch 
new industries in a far,flung territory. In that 
effort, one man spanned both the industrial and 
the political and became Hill's primary point 
man in the territory-Charles A. Broadwater. 
Charles A. Broadwater (Fig. 5). Broadwater 
came to Montana in 1862, a twenty,one year 
old with some experience in mercantile busi, 
nesses in St. Louis and an eagerness to pursue 
the main chance. Buying and selling cattle and 
horses led naturally to freighting and within a 
few years he operated the Diamond R freight 
outfit, which secured lucrative government 
contracts during the 1870s. Through his con, 
nections with businessmen like A. H. Wilder 
of St. Paul and with political support from Ter, 
ritorial Delegate Maginnis, Broadwater landed 
a series of contracts to build and supply military 
posts in Montana, bringing him substantial 
wealth. By the early 1880s, Broadwater had in, 
terests in a dozen or more businesses and had 
organized the Montana National Bank in Hel, 
ena, again with Wilder's help. It was probably 
through Wilder that Broadwater first met Hill, 
perhaps as early as 1876. 12 
By 1883 Broadwater had drifted away from 
an earlier alliance with Sam Hauser and eagerly 
joined Gibson's chorus to convince Hill to ex, 
FIG. 4. Samuel T. Hauser. Photo courtesy of Mon, 
tana Historical Society. 
tend the Manitoba westward to Montana and 
thereby break up the NP,UP transportation 
agreement. His split with Hauser began in mid, 
1882, shortly after he opened his national bank 
in Helena. The Broadwater, Wilder comb ina' 
tion, which also included Territorial Governor 
Benjamin F. Potts and Russell B. Harrison-
son of Senator and later president Benjamin 
Harrison-threatened Hauser. He scrambled to 
retain his own bank's profitable account with 
the Northern Pacific by cementing his rela, 
tionship with NP vice president T. F. Oakes, 
which tied him even more to the NP and would 
soon put him at further odds with Broadwater. 13 
These were momentous developments in 
Montana. Economic competition had dissolved 
the pragmatic alliance between Republicans 
Potts and Harrison, and Democrats Hauser, 
Broadwater, and Maginnis but its effects spilled 
over into politics. By widening an already de, 
veloping division among Montana Democrats, 
these antagonisms between the Broadwater and 
Hauser factions disrupted the connections 
Montana's democracy had with national party 
leaders. In Montana, echoes of the split would 
reverberate for more than two decades and rna, 
terially affect the fortunes of Hauser, Maginnis, 
W. A. Clark, and Marcus Daly. 14 For Hill, these 
developments represented an opening in Mon, 
tana, as Broadwater and Maginnis inclined away 
from Hauser and the Northern Pacific and to' 
ward him and the Manitoba. 15 
Aggressive, intelligent, and known for keep, 
ing his own counsel--one newspaper called him 
"not much of a cackler"-Broadwater would 
prove to be Hill's most effective agent in Mon, 
tana. In many ways it was a natural combina, 
tion. Both men were enamored of the bold public 
statement while harboring few if any political 
aspirations; both worked efficiently and stealth, 
ily through corporate agreements, and both 
understood that loyalty in finance and politics 
extended only as long as mutual interests were 
served. It is likely that Hill first learned of 
Broadwater's interest in developing northern 
Montana through Wilder and Maginnis, when 
Broadwater urged the opening of Indian reser, 
vation land to settlement in 1881. As chief 
contractor and post sutler at northern Mon, 
tana's Fort Assinniboine, Broadwater realized 
that the region north of the Missouri River was 
the best area in the territory for new railroad 
development. It would open up a vast region 
and coincidentally aid his business interests. 16 
HILL COMES To MONTANA 
At first Gibson was cautious about the am, 
bitious and somewhat secretive Broadwater, who 
had risen quickly in Montana and had devel, 
oped connections with eastern financiers and 
politicians. By June 1884, however, Gibson 
joined with Broadwater in hosting Hill and a 
company of engineers on a fast,paced tour of 
resource properties in Montana. 17 In four days, 
Broadwater whisked Hill and his men to mining 
properties near Helena, to Butte, and to Great 
Falls, Fort Benton, and the recently discovered 
coal properties at Sand Coulee in the Belt 
Mountains near Great Falls. Montana's press 
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FIG. 5. Charles A. Broadwater. Photo courtesy of 
Montana Historical Society. 
buzzed with reports, as Hill's party bounced over 
rough stage roads from location to location. 
Would Hill extend the Manitoba? Would he 
build to Fort Benton-to Helena-to Butte? 
The Butte Miner claimed to have intercepted a 
message from Gibson that confirmed Hill's 
promise to build the Manitoba to Great Falls; 
the Deer Lodge New Northwest speculated about 
Hill's involvement in a newly organized Sand 
Coulee Coal Company; and Fort Benton's River 
Press quoted Hill on the spot: "You can say," 
Hill told the paper, "that I think favorably of 
the proposed road from Helena to Fort Ben' 
ton."18 
Prominent in Hill's thinking about Mon, 
tana, aside from his two,year,old interest in the 
Great Falls townsite speculation, were the min' 
ing properties at Red Mountain near Helena 
and the coal deposits at Sand Coulee. The Red 
Mountain mines were in the rich Boulder Bath, 
olith that included Hauser's profitable silver 
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mines south of Helena and Tommy Cruse's spec-
tacular Drumlummon goldmine north of Hel-
ena. Early reports from Broadwater's mining 
engineers suggested that the Red Mountain 
properties might be the richest of the lot. After 
looking over the Sand Coulee coal field, Hill 
was sufficiently impressed with the results of 
Broadwater's early tests to contract with J. S. 
Newberry of the Columbia School of Mines to 
inspect Sand Coulee and Red Mountain de-
posits. Newberry's report confirmed Broadwa-
ter's boasts. 19 
At the heart of Hill's plans for Montana, 
however, was the construction of an industrial 
railroad, one that would link Great Falls and 
adjacent coal fields with Butte. The Montana 
Central would ship coal to Butte, Butte copper 
matte to a future Great Falls smelter, and Red 
Mountain precious metals to the Manitoba 
mainline at Great Falls for shipment. Hill chose 
Broadwater to quarterback the development of 
his investments in Montana and to head the 
Montana Central. 
CONFLICT WITH THE NORTHERN PACIFIC 
A constant element in Broadwater's work on 
Hill's behalf in Montana was the enmity of the 
Northern Pacific. That animosity had simmered 
for years and had developed from both railroads' 
beliefthat the other had invaded their territory: 
the NP claimed Montana, while the Manitoba 
claimed the Red River valley. 20 Using telegrams 
sent in code, Broadwater kept Hill apprised of 
the latest feints and tactical actions by NP man-
agers in Montana. Hill, in turn, relayed the 
information to Kennedy and other financiers 
before devising overall strategies. Between 1885, 
when Hill's group began planning for significant 
investment in Montana, and the completion of 
the Montana Central to Butte in 1888, the NP 
and Manitoba forces contested each other on 
several fronts. 21 
The conflict between the NP and the Man-
itoba became politically explosive in mid-1885, 
when Hauser captured the territorial governor's 
spot in a bitter fight with Maginnis. Broadwater 
and Hill supported Maginnis, while Territorial 
Delegate Joseph K. Toole and Missouri's Sen-
ator George Vest supported Hauser. The split 
was now complete and tinged with political bit-
terness. Broadwater, for example, had gone so 
far as to charge that Hauser had contributed to 
the Republicans during the 1884 presidential 
campaign. 22 
CONTROL OF THE RED MOUNTAIN MINES 
In the competition that mattered most-the 
economic one-a significant prize was control 
of the Red Mountain mines. That contest can 
serve here as a case study of the intricate and 
effective relationship Hill had with his point 
man in Helena. Located fifteen miles west of 
Helena up Ten Mile Creek, the mines had first 
been coveted by investors associated with the 
NP when Hauser, Maginnis, and Broadwater 
had hoped the NP would build a branch line 
to the area.23 Hauser had urged the NP to act 
quickly and company vice president Oakes had 
responded in early 1884, writing Hauser that 
"there will be no difficulty in building Ten Mile 
branch." But nothing materialized. By midyear 
Broadwater and other Hill associates made their 
move, investing in the Ten Mile district and 
planning a rail line to serve the mines. Broad-
water enlisted the help of Helena mining en-
gineer John Longmaid and Butte mining expert 
Thomas Couch. Throughout 1884 and 1885, 
Longmaid and Couch tunneled into Red Moun-
tain claims and sent their reports to Broadwater. 
First secretly buying up claims and then dis-
guising their connection with Hill's interests, 
Broadwater maneuvered in Helena financial 
circles to tie up the best claims. 24 
Broadwater played a secretive game, pur-
chasing blocks of Red Mountain claims and 
passing on the results of mineral tests to Hill, 
who kept abreast of developments. "Have they 
cut into the Lexington [mine] on lower level," 
Hill queried Broadwater in October 1885, "and 
if so what was the thickness?" Encouraged by 
what he learned from Broadwater, Hill had al-
ready factored these mining properties into his 
planned investment in Montana by mid-De-
cember. Meanwhile, St. Paul and Montana pa-
pers speculated about ownership of the mines, 
the amount invested, and when a railroad would 
be built to the mines. 25 
In the Red Mountain business, Broadwater 
had an advantage that must have frustrated 
Hauser's group. In 1873, he had married Julia 
Chumasero, daughter of a prominent Republi-
can lawyer and political ally of Wilbur F. Sand-
ers and other NP supporters. Not only had 
Broadwater married into what became the other 
camp a decade later, but he also had an inside 
line on the purchase of Chumasero's Red Moun-
tain properties, reportedly the best claims in the 
district. So by early 1886, Broadwater had de-
livered to Hill a handsome group of mining 
properties and an opportunity to build a paying 
rail line smack in the heart of NP territory. 26 
NP managers privately fumed and publicly 
questioned what Hill intended in Montana. 
Prohibited by their charter from building branch 
lines, the NP had to create separate companies 
to build branches. Writing as governor of Mon-
tana Territory in mid-January 1886, Hauser told 
NP executives that although he would encour-
age the building of any road that brought in-
vestment to Montana, he urged them to act 
quickly. But the NP dallied too long. Hill hired 
away one of the NP's finest engineers, Joseph 
T. Dodge, and sent him to Helena to work 
under Broadwater's keen direction. 27 
As Dodge went out to survey the line and 
pick the best route, trouble developed in Hel-
ena. On 16 January 1886 Broadwater disclosed 
to Hill, "I have always had some fears that the 
NP or its agents might get in ahead of us and 
give us some serious trouble." Broadwater told 
Hill that Maginnis had pumped T. C. Power, 
a wealthy Republican businessman with ties to 
the NP, about the NP's plan to build their own 
line up Ten Mile Creek and he got bad news. 
Broadwater immediately had his attorneys, 
Chumasero and Chadwick, look over the le-
galities of branch line building in Montana, 
telling Hill: "If they [NP] organize ahead of us 
they would have decidedly the best of us, in 
fact they would have rights." Act now, he 
warned Hill: "We have paid out so much money 
now that I do not deem it wise to jeopardize it 
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by any delay. "28 
While this drama over the Red Mountain 
line was beginning, Broadwater and Hill tipped 
their larger plans by chartering the Montana 
Central Railway, the road that would connect 
Butte with Great Falls and the Manitoba main-
line. The wording of the charter described their 
claim to a right-of-way "from a point one mile 
east of junction of the NP ... to some point 
near the northeasterly corner of [Lewis and 
Clark] county." Although the general public 
might have missed the point, the NP knew that 
Broadwater's facile description of the "north-
easterly corner" meant Great Falls. The charter 
also included a right-of-way for a branch line 
to Red Mountain. A few weeks later Broadwater 
and his associates also incorporated the Red 
Mountain Consolidated Mining Company to 
exploit the thirty-eight lodes of the Chumasero 
claims. It was a fast start for Hill's foray into 
Montana. 29 
In many respects, Hill's investments in Mon-
tana were only as safe as Broadwater's intelli-
gence and energy. As executive head of both 
the mining and railway companies, Broadwater 
directed engineer Dodge to survey the Ten Mile 
line and the Montana Central line north from 
Helena to Great Falls while he contended with 
the NP's challenge to their new enterprises and 
oversaw mining operations. In at least one in-
stance he had to put the whip to Dodge: "I find 
he is very much inclined to have his own way 
about things," Broadwater informed Hill. "He 
delayed our maps at least 3 days and would not 
have had them yet if I had not given him pos-
itive orders to put 2 more engineers on them." 
Hill worried that without a map filed with ter-
ritorial officials the incorporation of the railroad 
would be in jeopardy. As it turned out, such 
was not the case. It was the NP, however, that 
worried Broadwater most. As Hill put it to 
Broadwater, "I do not think our NP friends en-
tirely enjoy your enterprise. "30 
CONTROLLlNG ROUTES AND FINANCES 
In mid-February 1886, Hauser went to New 
York to drum up support for NP branch lines 
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from Helena to Butte and Helena to the Red 
Mountain mines. Rumors of his success in or-
ganizing a syndicate floated through St. Paul 
and Helena. One of Hill's financial partners in 
New York, Samuel Thome, warned him to 
"move very quickly" in Montana. But R. B. Har-
rison, a Hill and Broadwater confidant, was not 
so sure. Telegraphing Broadwater on 20 Feb-
ruary, Harrison thought that the rumors were a 
"possible bluff to compromise territory with 
you-watch and move quickly." Meanwhile 
Broadwater went to St. Paul to confer with Hill. 
From Helena, Maginnis confirmed on 23 Feb-
ruary that rumors were flying there. Writing to 
Broadwater in St. Paul, Maginnis repeated pub-
lic statements that Wilbur Sanders had made 
on behalf of the NP, testing the waters with 
promises of branch lines. But Maginnis down-
played the incident, writing that "nearly every-
one here construe [it) as a big bluff." Sanders 
"got no sympathy," Maginnis reported to 
Broadwater; "the whole town is with you." 
While Maginnis reassured St. Paul, the Mon-
tana Central managers in Helena moved to keep 
their advantage. William Harrison-a Mani-
toba man who had gone to Helena to be sec-
retary of the Montana Central-fired off a 
telegram on 24 February to Broadwater and Hill 
in St. Paul: "have deeds on record or contractors 
in possession all critical points to and including 
mouth canyon Red Mt. Branch. Dodge not re-
turned. Enemy invisible." Explaining further, 
Harrison wrote that "Hauser's championship of 
the N.P. is strongly deprecated [in Helena] .... 
I don't think they can follow Ten Mile Creek 
unless they . . . use our roadbed through the 
passes. "31 
Broadwater and his men had moved quickly, 
but had they been quick enough? Once he had 
returned to Helena and surveyed the situation 
Broadwater became convinced that the NP ploy 
was all bluff. Nonetheless he kept agitating 
against Hauser and the NP and threatened to 
call the matter before the Helena Board of Trade, 
a commercial club, to get "leading merchants 
to withdraw their patronage from N. P. and ship 
by U.P. until we get to Benton when they will 
use water route and our rails." Broadwater also 
planted embarrassing stories in Helena news-
papers, further stirring the issue. As Broadwater 
had hoped, Hauser began to hear from his Mon-
tana allies. Hauser's banking partner, A. ]. Davis 
of Butte, warned Hauser that the conflict with 
the Montana Central "was raising havoc with 
the bank" and if Hauser did not desist he would 
"kill himself politically." Talking with Broad-
water about the situation, Davis assured him 
that Butte would fight for the Montana Central 
because they wanted access to Great Falls coal. 
This news helped further allay Broadwater's 
worries about Hauser and the NP, but he steamed 
at what he considered Hauser's audacity. Hill 
himself worried that Broadwater might do some-
thing foolish. Broadwater assured him: "I have 
been extremely cautious to say nothing that 
would antagonize them," but it was clear that 
Broadwater had reached his limit. "While I dis-
like to make war on anyone," he wrote to Hill 
in a plaintive tone in early March, "the sooner 
we put him [Hauser] down the less trouble we 
will have in the future. He never put a dollar 
into Red Mountain, we did, and now he is 
trying to ruin our investment." Among his sug-
gestions, Broadwater thought that spreading 
embarrassing news about Hauser in New York 
to ruin his credibility with financiers might be 
a good plan. 32 
The situation concerned Hill, but removed 
as he was from the scratching talons and flying 
feathers in Helena he moved with more delib-
eration to settle the issue with the NP. At Hill's 
direction, Manitoba general manager Allen 
Manvel met with Oakes and NP president Rob-
ert Harris in New York in mid-March. In re-
sponse to questions about Hill's plans in 
Montana, Manvel disingenuously-and evi-
dently with a straight face-told Oakes and 
Harris that the Montana Central was a private 
operation and not connected with the Mani-
toba in any way and that "if it [Montana Cen-
tral] was to be sold [Hill] had expressed a 
willingness to let the Northern Pacific have the 
first chance at it." Probably dumbfounded and 
certainly angry, Oakes was not fooled by Man-
vel's explanation. He reacted caustically, scold-
ing Manvel and telling him to deliver a message 
to Hill: Oakes considered the Montana Central 
an unwarranted Manitoba invasion into NP ter-
ritory and the Manitoba could expect the worst 
from this. Manvel left the meeting certain that 
the NP planned to build the Red Mountain line 
and certain that the NP fully expected Hill to 
extend the Manitoba to Montana. 33 
BUILDING QUICKLY 
The NP "bluff" had suddenly become real. 
As the conflict in Helena continued to foam 
during March, Hill urged Broadwater to move 
quickly. "I am satisfied that the N.P. are greatly 
alarmed at Montana Central . . . and will do 
everything in their power to head it off." He 
instructed Broadwater: "work fully and . . . 
crowd the grading as fast as you can. I expect 
to have 3,000 tons of rails, with splices and 
spikes, ready to ship to you within two or three 
weeks." A hard push, Hill believed, would put 
the Montana Central line so close to finishing 
during the summer of 1886 that building the 
Red Mountain branch could proceed immedi-
ately. Hill's financial partners-especially 
Thome and Kennedy-agreed. 34 Writing to Hill 
on 30 March, Kennedy sent in his order for 300 
blocks of shares in Montana Ceptral stock and 
assured Hill: "I am quite sure you need appre-
hend no trouble from parties connected with 
the Northern Pacific Railroad. "35 
What Kennedy and Hill knew, as Hill told 
Broadwater, was that while the NP might try 
to harass the Montana Central there was not 
time for them meet the legal requirements al-
lowing them to condemn property for their Red 
Mountain line. Broadwater had beaten them to 
the ground. "We are so far ahead of them," 
Broadwater had written Hill, "they [NPl would 
not believe it. "36 Keeping on the offensive, 
Broadwater fed a news story to Associated Press 
in New York through R. B. Harrison that sought 
to embarrass Hauser in Helena. But the NP had 
no intention of giving up the fight. Throughout 
the next several months, their surveying crews 
contested Broadwater's men along the Ten Mile 
route. 
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CLAIMING THE ROUTE 
The issue was joined in a particularly narrow 
canyon where NP engineers forcefully tried to 
impede the grading. Broadwater appealed to the 
court for an injunction to halt the NP, arguing 
that the Montana Central had occupied the 
ground and had prior right to the grade. The 
Montana Central got the injunction, which was 
upheld by the Montana Supreme Court in late 
1886, forcing the NP to find another grade and 
to complete full legal requirements before con-
demning property along their line. 37 
The deadlock had been broken, at least for 
the time. The Montana Central crews contin-
ued to prepare the grade to Rimini, the terminus 
of the line, while Chief Engineer Adna An-
derson of the NP located another line through 
the narrow defile at the canyon mouth. Broad-
water and Hill could have breathed with some 
relief, but the NP was still determined to make 
the Manitoba's entry into Montana expensive. 
Knowing that Hill planned to ship his rails 
for the Montana Central over their line, the 
NP charged a high rate-$35 per ton-and re-
fused to ship at the $20 rate Hill requested. The 
NP's obstinance, plus other discourtesies such 
as denying pro forma passes for Montana Cen-
tral officials, confirmed Hill's view of the NP's 
management, which he had long considered 
idiosyncratic and shortsighted. After discus-
sions with Broadwater and his financial part-
ners, Hill decided to press forward with the 
Manitoba's extension to Montana and carry the 
rails themselves. They would lay them down 
during the 1887 season. 38 
At a gala held at the Grand Central Hotel 
in September 1886 in his honor, Hill told Hel-
enans that the NP's exorbitant freight rates had 
delayed the Montana Central, but the road 
would be completed to Helena by autumn 1887. 
And, he reminded his audience, they would get 
a bonus. The Montana Central's connection 
with the Manitoba in Great Falls would give 
Helena shippers a faster route to St. Paul. 
Standing before the group, Hill jabbed the NP 
as he read from a Northern Pacific timetable 
some jokester had placed under each dinner 
162 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1990 
plate. Hill told the group that the NP was twelve 
hours too slow; the Manitoba would serve them 
better and faster. 39 
BEST ROUTE To BUTTE 
As much as Hill genuinely reveled in the 
Montana Central's successful pursuit of the Red 
Mountain line and surveying the Helena-to-
Great Falls route, the ultimate destination and 
payoff for the Montana Central was Butte. 
Broadwater long before had convinced Hill that 
the Butte connection would guarantee that the 
Montana Central would be a paying road. In 
late April 1886, Broadwater reported to Hill 
that Daly had confirmed that earlier evaluation. 
"Daily [sic] says Butte is in her infancy," Broad-
water wrote Hill, "and will work 5 tons of ore 
where she is working one now. If so, the road 
from Butte to the falls value is unknown. So I 
think we had better fight it out on our line if 
it takes all summer. "40 
The fight Broadwater anticipated was again 
with the NP. Hauser had been after the NP 
managers for years to invest in an extension of 
the Wickes branch (built in 1883-84) to Butte, 
and it seemed they were now ready to proceed. 
Hill and Broadwater knew they would be in a 
race with the NP to run the first survey line to 
Butte, so they put the best man they could hire 
into the field. Discoverer of the Canadian Pa-
cific's route through the seemingly impregnable 
Selkirk Mountains in British Columbia, A. B. 
Rogers came to Helena in early May with in-
structions from Hill to find a route to Butte and 
to keep his purpose confidential. 41 Rogers strug-
gled through heavy snow drifts in mid-May, 
reporting to Hill that he had found a line "at 
a grade not exceeding 116' per mile." Nearly 
one month later, Rogers could report to Broad-
water "I have succeeded in getting a line. . . . 
I will call on you for that box of cigars . . ." 
Rogers had staked out the ground to Butte ahead 
of the NP. As Rogers wrote Hill in August, "I 
know you have the best route the country af-
fords, and the present efforts in the field will 
assure the possession of it to you. "42 
While Rogers had been in the field, claiming 
the best line in the steep and broken gulches 
between Helena and Butte, Broadwater had been 
busy in Helena, purchasing depot property and 
staking out potential sites for a smelter on the 
city's south side,43 The NP had also been busy, 
incorporating their Helena, Boulder Valley & 
Butte Railroad Company, surveying their line 
to Butte, and estimating the costs. But Broad-
water was confident that he had beaten them. 
One of his engineers had intercepted the NP 
contractor's grading estimates, which disclosed 
that the Montana Central had taken the best 
ground, forcing the NP to run their line with 
"a very large amount of curvature [with] ... 
numerous high trestles." The costs to the NP 
of building from Helena to Butte, Broadwater 
realized, would be prohibitive. 44 
CONCLUSION 
Broadwater had delivered on his promises 
and Hill had a secured road from Great Falls to 
Butte. What remained to be done by the Hill 
forces in late 1886 to make the Manitoba's ex-
tension and the Montana Central's building a 
reality is another story, too long to detail here. 
The arena was Washington and the prize was a 
right-of-way across Indian reservations in Da-
kota and Montana. Successful lobbying by Ma-
ginnis and others had brought out a bill to open 
the Indian reservations to white settlement, but 
President Grover Cleveland stunned Hill and 
his colleagues by vetoing the measure in July 
1886. Hill, Broadwater, Maginnis, Kennedy, 
and others applied more pressure and Hill finally 
got his right-of-way in 1887.45 
There were more fights with the Northern 
Pacific over the Red Mountain and Butte lines. 
And there were scraps in Helena, including a 
desperate harassment just days before the last 
mile of track was spiked down south of town. 
In a final gesture of spite, the NP laid track 
across the Montana Central's right-of-way, 
where it crossed over the NP's grade. The NP 
parked one of their locomotives on the spot, 
threatening to force the Montana Central into 
court to get the NP engine off their line. Cooler 
heads in the NP organization ordered the tracks 
taken up in time for the completion of the Mon-
tana Central, but it was testimony to the con-
tinuing enmity of the two roads in Montana, 
an enmity that prevailed until the signing of 
the London Agreement in 1896. 46 
Despite the ongoing competition with the 
NP, Hill would achieve most of his goals in 
Montana after the completion of the Montana 
Central. The first trains to Butte arrived in 1888, 
and within two years Butte ore was being shipped 
over the Montana Central to a smelter in Paris 
Gibson's industrial city on the Missouri. Hill 
also built branch lines to the Sand Coulee and 
Belt coal fields and a major feeder line north 
to Canada, but despite the effort on the Red 
Mountain line the Manitoba abandoned the ef-
fort and let the NP build to Rimini. 
Meanwhile, the NP did not complete the 
too expensive Helena-to-Butte line, opting to 
build directly west to Butte from Three Forks. 
An NP-sponsored company did build a line to 
the Drumlummon mine at Marysville, but none 
of their building seriously damaged the Mon-
tana Central. Hauser got his extension of the 
Wickes branch in 1887, even though he de-
cided the next year to build a new silver and 
lead smelter next to the NP mainline east of 
Helena, a smelter that still operates today and 
is one of only a few remaining lead smelters in 
North America. 
Throughout it all, Hill's point men in Mon-
tana had done their job. Gibson had attracted 
investment and settlement in Great Falls and 
Maginnis had done his work well in Washing-
ton and among Montana politicos. Broadwater 
had been the most involved and the most suc-
cessful. But what had happened to Montana in 
the process? There are always two sides to any 
ledger and it was no different in this case. The 
corporate war in Montana left stains. The effort 
that had taken so much of Broadwater's time 
was part of a longer and larger battle over con-
trol of investment, the sources of that invest-
ment, and the colonialization of the American 
frontier by interests east of the Plains. The cor-
porate managers used the power of investment 
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to gain advantage on the frontier, often em-
ploying the energy and creativity of their point 
men. 
In Montana, as elsewhere, the railroad wars 
corrupted and disrupted territorial politics. The 
battle between Broadwater and Hauser split the 
Democratic Party in Montana and soon became 
a scene in a broader political struggle that pitted 
Helena against Anaconda in the fight over the 
permanent location of the state capital and 
erupted in the estrangement and then open hos-
tility between copper barons Marcus Daly and 
William A. Clark. The content of political dia-
logue followed the low path outlined by the 
corporate struggle. Political alliances were made 
to acquire local economic advantage that could 
be enlisted to aid in the ongoing corporate bat-
tle. The point men brought all of it home and 
allowed the corporate managers to wage their 
disputes on Montana's turf. At the conclusion, 
Montana's political system suffered, and Hill 
and his men moved on to other fields. 
These disruptions and dislocations aside, for 
most Montanans the completion of the Mon-
tana Central and the Manitoba brought enor-
mous gain. The NP-UP rate pool had been 
broken, which meant more competitive freight 
rates, at least in the short run; within a decade, 
however, the railroads had combined to levy 
rates Montanans thought were extortionate. 
Montana's industrial economy expanded as a 
direct result of Hill's foray into the territory, 
especially at Great Falls where construction of 
a dam across the Missouri, the construction of 
a sizable copper smelter, and mining nearby coal 
fields made it one of Montana's major industrial 
cities within a decade. By connecting Butte to 
Great Falls, the Montana Central opened an 
industrial corridor along the Continental Di-
vide, which spurred more mining and manu-
facturing activity and gave the area access to a 
national market through the Manitoba line. 
Agricultuml development also benefited from 
building the Manitoba-Montana Central line. 
Whites who had lusted for access to Indian lands 
north of the Missouri River got their wish ful-
filled, even if meant wholesale theft of Indian 
lands in service of the railroad lords. Within 
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two decades, agricultural immigrants rushed to 
the area served by the Manitoba, constituting 
the largest land rush in the history of the north-
ern Plains. Hill's dream of an agricultural fee-
simple empire of farmers served by his railroad 
along the northern tier became a reality when 
the homestead boom brought thousands to stake 
out dryland farms on the Montana steppes. Hill 
spared no effort to encourage settlement along 
his line, echoing some of the promotional hy-
perbole that accompanied the Montana Central 
excitement of the 1880s. That great inrush of 
settlers radically altered Montana politics in the 
twentieth century and led directly to the cre-
ation of dozens of new counties and a new con-
stituency that continues to playa major political 
role in the state. 
Finally, for Helena, the Montana Central 
meant an infusion of new capital, as Broadwater 
funneled investment from Hill and Hill's finan-
cier friends into railroad, real estate, and mining 
companies that he managed. It also bolstered 
Helena's position in competition with other cit-
ies, especially Butte and Daly's Anaconda. So, 
for Helenans, there was great reason for rejoic-
ing on that day in November 1887, when the 
town feted James J. Hill at the Opera House. 
And Broadwater must have been at least a little 
bit smug as he heard Hill recount the essence 
of Broadwater's service to the Manitoba: 
It is now about three years since I first saw 
your beautiful mountains and your city [when] 
. . . Col. Broadwater, your enterprising cit-
izen, was at that time particularly anxious 
that I should come out here to see what a 
field there was for railway development, and 
when I came here he did not give me any 
peace until he had rushed me over the moun-
tains four times, I think, in three days. He 
insisted that every stone was a mine; and he 
told his story so well that I am half inclined 
to believe him rightY 
During those three years, Broadwater had told 
his story well enough to bring Hill's money to 
Helena, to cut his friends in on much of the 
opportunity, and to prevail over his rivals. He 
had served his interests and what he perceived 
to be Helena's and Montana's interests, while 
for Hill he became an ultimate operative-a 
corporate point man on the western frontier. 
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